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Abstract: Previous research related to the implementation of GCG was mostly related to operational 
performance, for example, ROI and ROE. However, there is no research on GCG implementation that 
is related to corporate value and earnings quality as moderating objects. Corporate value is a measure 
of market performance that is very important because high corporate value describes the market value 
of a company that is more valuable than the company's noted value. Therefore, this study wants to 
develop GCG implementation that associated with a corporate value, which is practically influenced by 
stock and asset prices also how the influence of corporate governance implementation on corporate 
value and earnings quality as moderating variables. Thus, in general, this study aims to determine the 
practice of corporate governance with the implementation of the CG Index. This study aims to examine 
the effect of implementing the CG Index on Corporate Value, specifically. 
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1. Introduction 
Good corporate governance (GCG) is a system that regulates and controls the 
companies that create additional value for all stakeholders (Dewi, Suhadak & 
Handayani, 2017). This concept emphasises two things, namely the importance of 
the shareholders right to obtain information correctly and promptly as well as the 
obligation of companies to conduct accurate, timely and transparent disclosure of all 
information on company performance, ownership, and stakeholders. There are five 
main components needed in the concept of GCG, namely Commitment to CG, 
Structure and Function of the Directors Board, Environment and Processes Control, 
Transparency and Disclosure, and also the Rights of Minority Shareholders 
(Demirag, 1998). The five components are necessary because the application of 
GCG principles is consistently proven to improve the quality of financial statements 
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and also be an obstacle to fraudulent activities which results in undescribed financial 
statements of the company's fundamental values. From the various results of 
previous studies, it shows that the implementation of corporate governance in 
Indonesia is deficient still. This condition happens mainly because companies in 
Indonesia do not yet have a corporate culture as the core of Corporate Governance. 
This understanding opens the horizon that companies in Indonesia have not 
implemented governance properly and effectively. 
In Indonesia, issues related to corporate governance reinforced after the financial 
crisis that occurred in Asia in mid-1997 (Husnan, 2001; Lukviarman, 2016). In its 
development, this issue has become increasingly popular after multilateral financial 
institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) revealed 
that the financial crisis that hit Asia, among others, was caused by the weak 
implementation of corporate governance. Indonesia is claimed to be the country that 
suffered the most and the slowest rise from the impact of the crisis (ADB, 2000). 
The ADB report (2000) shows the phenomena that occur in Indonesia, among others, 
the absence of professional company management because the concentration of 
ownership allows the occurrence of affiliation between the owner, supervisor and 
manager of the company, and the non-functioning of the Board of Commissioners. 
According to Zarkasyi (2008), the results of the 1998 Booz-Allen and Hamilton 
survey showed that the effectiveness of corporate governance in Indonesia was the 
lowest in East Asia (2.88) compared to Thailand (4.89), Malaysia (7.72), Singapore 
(8.93), and Japan (9.17). In 2014, a survey conducted by Credit Lyonnais Securities 
Asia (CLSA) regarding the evaluation of the implementation of corporate 
governance in Asia Pacific countries showed Indonesia’s position at number 10 with 
a score of 39 (using the CG Watch Market Score) from 11 Asia Pacific countries 
(Abdullah, Percy & Stewart, 2015; Lukviarman, 2016).  
Previous research related to the implementation of GCG was mostly related to 
operational performance, for example, ROI and ROE. However, there is no research 
on GCG implementation that is related to corporate value and earnings quality as 
moderating objects. Corporate value is a measure of market performance that is very 
important because high corporate value describes the market value of a company that 
is more valuable than the company’s noted value. Therefore, this study wants to 
develop GCG implementation that associated with a corporate value, which is 
practically influenced by stock and asset prices also how the influence of corporate 
governance implementation on corporate value and earnings quality as moderating 
variables. Thus, in general, this study aims to determine the practice of corporate 
governance with the implementation of the CG Index. This study aims to examine 
the effect of implementing the CG Index on Corporate Value, specifically. 
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Background 
The implementation of GCG serves as an increase in competitiveness among 
companies and ultimately increases competitiveness with foreign countries. GCG 
implementation can certainly improve company performance and ultimately increase 
corporate value. The company aims to maximise the welfare of shareholders by 
maximising corporate value. Company value is the market value of a company’s 
stock that reflects the owner’s wealth. The higher the stock price signifies, the higher 
the owner’s wealth. Investors will choose to invest in companies with maximum 
company value because they can provide maximum shareholder prosperity — the 
maximum company value achieved if the company can operate by achieving targeted 
profits. The targeted profit will obtain if the company can implement GCG. In the 
long run, the company’s goal is to maximise corporate value. The higher corporate 
value describes, the more prosperous the owner. Corporate value, which forms 
through indicators of stock market value, is strongly influenced by investment 
opportunities. Investment expenditures provide a positive signal about the 
company’s growth in the future, thus increasing stock prices as an indicator of 
corporate value (Arniati, 2008). One measurement of corporate value is Price to 
Book Value (PBV), which is a comparison of the market price of a stock with its 
Book Value (BV). PBV shows how far the company can create corporate value. 
Companies that run well generally have PBV above 1, which shows market value is 
higher than the value of the book. With a high PBV ratio shows high stock prices. In 
addition to PBV, the indicator used to measure corporate value is Tobins' Q ratio. 
1.1. Corporate Governance 
Corporate Governance is a system designed to direct the management of the 
company professionally based on the principles of transparency, accountability, 
responsibility, independence, fairness, and equality (Effendi, 2016). Corporate 
governance is a concept that approachable by various kinds of theories, one of which 
is agency theory. Corporate governance is expected to function as a tool to provide 
confidence to investors that they will receive returns on funds that invested. 
Corporate governance is related to how investors are confident that the manager will 
provide benefits for his investment. Investors believe that managers will not 
embezzle or invest in unprofitable projects, and are related to how investors control 
managers (Larcker, Richardson & Tuna, 2007). Corporate governance practices in 
each company reflect the mindset of top management and the value system adopted 
by the company for a long time. In most companies, corporate governance did not 
develop through natural business processes but forced to adopt due to legal 
compliance requirements from certain countries or follow certain industry standards 
(Nisa & Warsi, 2008). Each company establishes corporate governance code based 
on the condition of the company. At present, the company’s operations are not 
limited to one country but have crossed various countries. In such conditions, there 
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is a need for governance standards that can be universally accepted by each company 
operating in various countries. 
1.2. Corporate Value 
Corporate value is an investor’s perception that often associated with stock prices. 
High stock prices increase corporate value. Corporate value commonly indicated by 
a high PBV will make the market believe in the company’s prospects going forward. 
There are several ratios used in measuring corporate value, among others, by using 
Tobin’s Q ratio which is the market value of a company by comparing the market 
value of a company listed on the financial market with the value of replacing 
company assets (Lindenberg & Ross, 1981). If the market value merely reflects the 
assets recorded in a company, then Tobin’s Q will be equal to 1. If Tobin’s Q is 
greater than 1, the market value is higher than the value of the listed company assets. 
The words indicate that the stock overvalued. If Tobin’s Q is less than 1, the market 
value is smaller than the value of the company's recorded assets. The indicates that 
the stock is undervalued. The Q-ratio is a more accurate measure of how effectively 
management uses economic resources in its power. Research conducted by 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) shows how the Tobin-q ratio applies to each company. 
They found that some companies could maintain a Tobin-q ratio higher than one 
would attract new resource and competition flows until the q-ratio approached one. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
In the perspective of agency theory, agents who are risk-averse and tend to be selfish 
will allocate resources from investments that do not increase the value of a more 
profitable investment company. Agency problems will indicate that the value of the 
company will increase if the owner of the company can control the behaviour of 
management so as not to waste company resources, both in the form of investments 
that are not feasible or in the form of shirking. Corporate Governance is a system 
that regulates and controls companies that are expected to provide and increase the 
value of the company to shareholders. Thus, the application of GCG is believed to 
increase company value (Herawaty, 2008) According to Nasution and Setiawan 
(2007), corporate governance is a concept that is proposed to improve company 
performance through supervision or to monopolise management performance and 
establishing management accountability to stakeholders based on the regulatory 
framework. The concept of corporate governance is proposed to achieve more 
transparent corporate management for all users of financial statements. Because of 
increasing company value, management often takes opportunistic actions by 
conducting earnings management. The corporate governance mechanism will limit 
the actions of opportunistic earnings management because of the control 
mechanisms within the company. 
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Some public companies that have participated in corporate governance perception 
index (CGPI) have benefited from the application of good corporate governance 
(GCG), including the application of GCG to maximise company value through 
increasing orientation on the principles of openness, accountability, responsibility, 
independence and fairness in carrying out business activities. The fundamental thing 
falls from the implementation of GCG is the commitment of the leadership and all 
members of the company to adapt GCG principles in their business activities 
(Ramadhani, Andreas & Desmiyawati, 2015). The existence of corporate 
governance ratings in the form of CGPI, investors can expect that companies that 
rank highest will be better corporate governance than companies that rank below. 
CGPI ranking obtained by the company can attract the interests of stakeholders so 
that the value of the company will increase. The higher CGPI score indicates that the 
company is increasingly trusted by interested parties (stakeholders) That makes the 
company able to increase high profitability and can attract investors to invest in 
expanding their business Amman, David and Markus (2011) find a strong and 
positive relationship between corporate governance and the value of the company 
an. The results of the study indicate that better corporate governance practices are 
reflected in statistics and economics significantly in higher market values. 
The results of previous studies show mixed results, but there is a tendency that 
corporate governance practices in public companies are positively related to firm 
value. The implementation of corporate governance indicates by the score of 
applying CG index which has a positive effect on firm value. According to the World 
Bank Group (2014), the CG index consists of a commitment to CG, structure and 
functioning of the board of directors, control environment and processes, 
transparency and disclosure, and rights of minority shareholders. Based on the above 
arguments, the research hypothesis formulates as follows: 
H1: Commitment to CG has a positive effect on corporate value; 
H2: Structure and functioning of the Board of Directors has a positive effect on 
corporate value; 
H3: Control environment and processes have a positive effect on corporate value; 
H4: Transparency and disclosure have a positive effect on corporate value; 
H5: Rights of minority shareholders have a positive effect on corporate value; 
H6: Profit Quality reinforces the positive influence of commitment to CG on 
corporate value; 
H7: Profit quality reinforces the positive influence of structure and functioning 
of the Board of Directors on corporate value; 
H8: Profit quality strengthens the positive influence of control environment and 
processes on corporate value; 
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H9: Profit quality reinforces the positive influence of transparency and 
disclosure on corporate value; 
H10: Profit quality strengthens the positive influence of rights of minority 
shareholders on corporate value. 
 
3. Research Concept 
Commitment to CG
Structure and Functioning of 
the Board of Directors
Control Environment and 
Processes
Transparency and Disclosure






4. Research Method 
The sample of this research is manufacturing companies listing in the Indonesian 
capital market from 2012 to 2016. The results of a preliminary survey on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) obtained data on manufacturing companies listing 
up to 2016 as many as 138 companies. Based on sample selection, obtained 115 
companies that fulfil the data. Observations were made over 5 years so that the 
number was 575 cases. This study uses secondary data, namely company data 
published on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, consisting of: 
a. Company annual report (annual report) consisting of reports of the Board of 
Commissioners and Directors and Financial Reports: (statement of financial position 
(balance sheet), income statement and cash flow statement, and notes to financial 
statements); 
b. Corporate governance components include a commitment to CG, structure and 
functioning of the board of directors, control environment and processes, 
transparency and disclosure, and rights of minority shareholders. 
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Research variables group into independent variables, dependent variables, and 
moderating variables. The independent variable is the CG consumption index which 
consists of a commitment to CG, structure and functioning of the board of directors, 
control environment and processes, transparency and disclosure, rights of minority 
shareholders. Measurement of variables using CG disclosure scores reported by 
companies in the annual report. The dependent variable is Corporate Value, which 
is the value of the company measured by the value/ratio of Tobin-Q (Q ratio) with 
the formula: 
Q Ratio = ME + (ME + PS + Debt)/TA 
Notes 
ME = Value of stock price 
PE = Value of preferred stock 
Debt = Total Debt - Current assets + inventory 
 
Moderating variables are earnings quality, which is the quality of corporate earnings 
as measured by the lateral discretion value developed by Kothari, Leone, & Wasley 
(2005) using proxy performance-adjusted discretionary accruals. In particular, 
researchers estimate the accrual discretion values as follows: 
TAccri;t = α0 + α1(1/Assetsi,t-1) + α2Revi;t + α3PPEi;t + α4ROAi;t + i;t 
Notes 
Residuals from the regression model are discretionary accruals. The researcher used 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals (DisAccr) multiplied by -1 as the proxy 
for earnings quality. 
 
5. Analysis Method 
The analysis method uses two stages, using Regression Analysis (RA) and using the 
Moderating Regression Analysis (MRA) with moderating variables. The statistical 
model presents below. 
CorpValue = 
α + β1KomitCG + β2StrFuncBoD + β3ConEnvProces + 





α + β1KomitCG + β2StrFuncBoD + β3ConEnvProces + 




CorpValue = α + β1KomitCG + β2StrFuncBoD + β3ConEnvProces + 
β4TransDisclos + β5 RightsMinor + β6EarnQual +  
(3) 
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β7KomitCG *EarnQual + β8 StrFuncBoD *EarnsQual + 
β9ConEnvProces *EarnQual + β10 TransDisclos 




α : Constant 
β : Regression Coeffisien 
CorpValue : Corporate Value 
KomitCG : Commitment to Corporate Governance 
StrFuncBoD : Structure and Function of the Board (Board of 
Commissioners) 
ConEnvProces : Environmental and Process Control 
TransDisclos : Transparency and Disclosure 
RightsMinor : Rights of Minority Shareholders 
EarnQual  Earning Quality 
KomitCG 
*EarnQual 
: Interaction Commitment to CG with Earning Quality 
StrFuncBoD : Interaction Structure and Function of the DK with 
Earning Quality 








: Interaction of the Rights of Minority Shareholders with 
Earning Quality 
ε : Error term 
 
6. Findings and Discussion 
Corporate governance (CG) implementation on the commitment aspect of CG which 
has seven items with an average score of 6.24, the highest score of 7 and the lowest 
score of 0, the highest score of 7 is 59.4%. These results illustrate that most 
manufacturing companies have implemented seven items (out of 7 items) in the 
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aspect of commitment to CG including ownership of CG charter, implementing CG 
rules, codes of ethics and CG policies, expressing compliance with CG, and having 
the official responsible for implementing CG. 
CG implementation in the structure and function aspects of the Board of 
Commissioners (DK) which has 13 items with an average score of 7.71, the highest 
score of 12 and the lowest score of 0, the highest score of 10 is 31.7%. This result 
illustrates that most manufacturing companies have implemented 10 items (out of 12 
items) on the structure and function aspects of the DK, including the structure and 
structure of the DK, having independent commissioners, having committees tasked 
with assisting DK, DK’s role in directors, having diversity of expertise, and 
conducting DK meetings periodically. 
Implementation of environmental control aspects and processes that have 16 items 
with an average score of 9.26, the highest score of 16 and the lowest score of 0, the 
highest score of 10 is 46.5%. These results illustrate that most manufacturing 
companies have implemented ten items (out of 16 items) environmental control 
aspects and processes including adequate internal controls, having an Audit 
Committee, having risk restrictions and risk management systems, having internal 
audit functions, having compliance programs, and has internal and external audits. 
Implementation of transparency and disclosure aspects that have six items with an 
average score of 4.64, the highest score of 6 and the lowest score of 0, the highest 
score of 5 is 69.3%. These results illustrate that most manufacturing companies have 
implemented 5 items (out of 6 items) aspects of transparency and disclosure, among 
others in the form of presenting financial statements according to accounting 
standards (general SAK), disclosing principal transactions, transactions with related 
parties, off-balance-sheet activities, and other material events, the DK/Audit 
Committee reviews the critical elements of the financial statements, has a material 
(financial and non-financial) written information disclosure policy, is timely and 
equally available to all stakeholders. 
Implementation of aspects of the rights of minority shareholders who have five items 
with an average score of 4.64, the highest score of 5 and the lowest score of 0, the 
highest score of 1 is 49.5%. This result illustrates that most manufacturing 
companies have implemented 1 item (out of 5 items) aspects of the rights of minority 
shareholders, among others in the form of preparations and calls for annual and 
extraordinary GMS that allow the participation of all shareholders (sufficient notice, 
agenda and supporting material. All of that includes propose agenda items; 
participation in person or through a proxy; right to ask questions; dissemination of 
results of meetings). 
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Table 1. Description of Research Variables 
 
Commitmen


















Mean 6.24 9.71 9.26 4.64 1.34 1.68 0.34 
Median 7.00 10.00 10.00 5.00 1.00 0.94 0.04 
Mode 7.00 10.00 10.00 5.00 1.00 -2.39 -0.55 
Std. Deviation 1.25 2.05 2.08 1.18 1.16 2.50 3.99 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.39 -0.88 
Maximum 7.00 12.00 16.00 6.00 5.00 18.40 56.82 
 
7. Conclusion 
The results of the analysis and testing of hypotheses presented in the Table show that 
the commitment to CG (commitment to CG) and the protection of the rights of 
minority shareholders have a positive effect on corporate value. The results of 
interaction testing indicate that earnings quality strengthens the positive influence of 
the CG index, structure and function of the Board of Directors, and protection of 
minority rights (shareholders’ rights) on corporate value (corporate value). While 
earnings quality strengthens the negative influence of CG index, commitment to CG 
(commitment to CG), transparency and disclosure to corporate value (corporate 
value). Thus it can be concluded that commitment to CG (commitment to CG) and 
transparency and disclosure (transparency and disclosure) have a positive effect on 
corporate value. However, after being moderated by earnings quality earnings, 
showing that the protection of the rights of minority shareholders (rights of minority 
shareholders consistently has a positive effect on corporate value), the commitment 
to CG (commitment to CG) hurts company value). The results of hypothesis testing 
summarised as follows: 
 
Hipotesis : Statement Decision 
H1 : Commitment to CG has a positive effect on corporate value Proven 
H2 
: The structure and functioning of the Board of Directors has 
a positive effect on corporate value 
Not proven 
H3 












: Profit Quality reinforces the positive influence of 
commitment to CG on corporate value 
Evidenced by the 
opposite results 
H7 
: Profit Quality reinforces the positive influence of structure 




: Profit quality strengthens the positive influence of control 
environment and processes on corporate value 
Not proven 
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H9 
: Profit quality reinforces the positive influence of 
transparency and disclosure on corporate value 
Evidenced by the 
opposite results 
H10 
: Profit quality strengthens the positive influence of rights of 
minority shareholders on corporate value 
Proven 
 





Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .312 .716  .435 .663 
Commitment to CG .267 .124 .134 2.147 .032** 
Structure and functioning of the BoD -.123 .085 -.101 -1.443 .150 
Control environment and processes .004 .082 .003 .049 .961 
Transparency and disclosure .109 .115 .052 .945 .345 
Rights of minority shareholders .212 .109 .098 1.942 .053* 
Earnings Quality 2.138 2.729 3.419 .784 .434 
ContEnviron*EarnQual -.316 .193 -5.160 -1.641 .102 
TranspDisc*EarnQual -.365 .198 -2.807 -1.837 .067* 
Right*EarnQual 2.835 .934 4.535 3.035 .003** 
R 0.233     
R Square 0.054     
Adjusted R Square 0.037     
F 3.145     
Sig. 0.001***     
a. Significancy Level ***1%. **5%. *10% 
b. Dependent Variable: Corporate Value 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Right1_EarnQual1, Transparancy & Disclusure 1, Right & Shareholders 1, 
Commitent 1, Control & Enviroment 1, Structure & DK 1, TranspDisc1_EarnQual1, 
ContEnviron1_EarnQual1, EarnrQual1 
 
Table 3. Results of Regression Analysis and Hypothesis Testing (Extention) 
 
8. Conclusion 
The results of the study show that commitment to CG and protection of shareholders’ 
rights have a positive effect on company value. The results of interaction testing 
indicate that the quality of earnings reinforces the positive influence of the CG index: 
Excluded Variables 







Komit*EarnQual -16.801b -1.975 .049** -.089 2.625E-5 
StrukDK*EarnQual 22.413b 3.227 .001*** .144 3.887E-5 
a. Significancy Level ***1%. **5%. *10% 
b. Dependent Variable: Corporate Value 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Right1_EarnQual1, Transparancy & Disclusure 1, Right & Shareholders 
1, Commitent 1, Control & Enviroment 1, Structure & DK 1, TranspDisc1_EarnQual1, 
ContEnviron1_EarnQual1, EarnrQual1 
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the structure and function of the DK and the protection of the rights of minority 
shareholders to the value of the company. While earnings quality reinforces the 
negative influence of CG index: commitment to CG, transparency and disclosure of 
company value. The results concluded that commitment to CG and the protection of 
the rights of minority shareholders had a positive effect on the value of the company. 
However, after being moderated by earnings quality, it shows that the protection of 
the rights of minority shareholders is consistently positive for firm value, whereas 
commitment to CG hurts their value. 
The results of the study contribute to corporate governance practices and the 
assessment of corporate governance in manufacturing companies in the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. The implementation of corporate governance, especially the aspect 
of commitment to CG and protection of the rights of shareholders, can increase the 
value of the company. This aspect is undoubtedly considered important by 
stakeholders, especially investors, that the company runs the principles of good 
corporate governance. However, aspects of the protection of shareholders’ rights are 
still limited to the points of preparation and annual and extraordinary GMS calls that 
allow the participation of all shareholders (sufficient notice, supporting agenda and 
material; propose agenda items; participation privately or through a proxy; the right 
to ask questions, dissemination of meeting results, agenda, participation in person or 
through a proxy, the right to ask questions, dissemination of results of meetings. 
This research has limitations in accessing data related to the implementation of 
qualitative corporate governance. The explanations revealed in the company’s 
annual report are partially incomplete, making it difficult to give conclusions and 
scoring. Researchers use the interpretation of disclosure of the implementation of 
CG based on the subject matter of the researcher. Also, this study uses scoring 
disclosure of corporate governance aspects with a score of 1 (revealing) and a score 
of 0 (not revealing). This kind of disclosure scoring certainly has limitations in the 
value of implementation only to the information disclosed in the annual report. 
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